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ABSTRACT: This paper develops Bayesian tools for making inferences about
firm-specific inefficiencies in panel data models. We begin by establishing a
Bayesian setting in which fixed and random effects models are defined. What
distinguishes both classes of models is the marginal prior independence of the
effects. These techniques are applied to a panel of U.S. hospitals. Our empirical
findings illustrate the different characteristics of both types of models, as well
as the influence of the particular priors used on the firm effects. In addition, we
find that variables such as non-profit, for-profit or government-run dummies and
an average Herfindahl index have little explanatory power for hospital efficien-
cies.
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1. Introduction
Cost containment in health care is one of the most important public policy
issues in modern America. Since hospital spending is a large part of total health
care spending, an understanding of the cost siructure of hospitals is crucial.
This paper uses data from a large panel of U.S. hospitals from 1987-1991 to
investigate hospital efficiencies. We use the stochastic cost frontier methodolo-
gy for panel data described in, for instance, Schmidt and Sickles (19841. We
introduce firm-specific or individual effects, which are assumed to be constant
over time. No time effects will be considered in this paper. This methodology is
typically implemented using one of two approaches which are often called the
fixed and random effects models. The differences between these two types of
models can be viewed, from a Bayesian perspective, as a difference in the
structure of the príor information.
We develop a Bayesian framework in which we define fixed effects and
random effects models. Our Bayesian fixed effects models are characterized by
marginal prior independence between the individual effects, which are thus not
linked across firms, but are only assumed constant over time. We distinguish
the standard individual effects (SIE) model, where an improper prior on
individual intercepts is used. We call our second fixed effects model the
marginally independent efficiency distribution (MIED) model. In the latter model
we use a proper prior on the firm-specific effects, which are still independent. In
this context, the stochastic frontier interpretation implies that the inefficiency
error should be one-sided, and the Bayesian approach allows us to easily
incorporate this prior information.
In the so-called Bayesian random effects models we assume prior links
between the individual effects: their means can be functionally related to certain
firm characteristics, which defines the varying efficiency distribution (VED)
model, or they can all be drawn from a common distribution, leading to the
common efficiency distribution (CEDI model.
With respect to the existing Bayesian literature, i.e. van den Broeck, Koop,
Osiewalski and Steel (1994) and Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1994), we have
incorporated the following methodological advances: il treatment of panel data
as opposed to a cross-section analysis, ii) explicitly allowing efficiencies to4
depend on firm characteristics, iii) providing Bayesian counterparta to the
classical fixed and random effects models.
Our application indicates that the techniques we propose ara computationally
feasible and yield sensible results. We explicitly state the consequences of
certain prior assumptions, and illustrate the differencea between Bayesian fixed
and random effects models. The estimated frontier is largely consistent with
economic regularity conditions, and prior sensitivity of inference on efficiencies
is examined. However, we find that the types of variables which we expect to
affect efficiency (i.e. non-profit, for-profit or government-run dummies and a
Herfindahl indexl, do not do so in a systematic manner.
? Efficiencv Analvsis with Panel Data
In order to measure hospital efficiencies, we adopt the stochastic frontier.
framework first developed by Meeusen and van den Bros~ck (1977) snd Aigner,
Lovell and Schmidt (1977). This methodology postulates a cost frontier,
reflecting technology common to all firms, which represents the minimum
attainable cost of producing a given level of outputls). Deviations from this
frontier reflect either measurement error or inefficiency. Measurement error is
symmetric and Normally distributed while inefficiency has some one-sided
distribution. For instance, if y, is the log of costs of firm i and x, is a vector of k
appropriate explanatory variables, then a typical stochastic frontier model may
be specified as:
Yr~oo}xiitvr'ur, (1)
where the k-dimensional vector ~ describes the frontier, u; and v, are indepen-
dent of each other, v; is i.i.d. Normal and u, is i.i.d. with some one-sided
distribution, i-1,..,N. Given these assumptions, the likelihood function can be
derived and inferences made about the firm apecific inefficiencies. We analyze
overall productive efficiency in the sense of Farrell ( 1957) (see Kopp and
Diewert ( 198211. We interpret ( 1) as defining a conditional model for y; given x„
and thus we assume that sufficient conditions for the weak exogeneity of x, are
fulfilled (see Engle, Hendry end Richard ( 198311. On account of the
independence across firms, we can then validly use (1) for predictions
corresponding to, as yet, unobserved firms, as explained in Osiewalski and Steel
(19941.5
In previous work (van den Broeck, Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1994)), we
have argued for the adoption of a Bayesian perspective for making inferences
from such models, since such an approach yields exact finite sample results,
allows us to mix over models, to conduct inference on the actual efficiencies,
and surmounts some difficult statistical issues which arise in classical analyses.
In the present application, we have panel data and new issues arise which
necessitate an extension of our previous work. The classical econometric
analysis of firm efficiency with panel data is described in Schmidt and Sickles
(19841. If we extend (1) to allow for a time component (t - 1,..,T) and assume
that efficiency is constant over time for a given firm, we obtain:
Y;-(ao}U;1irtX;Qt~r, 12)
where y; is now a Tx1 vector containing observations for firm i, X; is Txk, iT is a
Tx1 vector of ones, and v; is i.i.d. N(0,~1T), i- 1,...,N. There are two ways of
proceeding with this model, which correspond to the distinction between the
fixed effects and the random effects model used in panel data analysis.
In the classical fixed effects model, we define a; - ao t u;, where the u;'s are
the individual effects. The inefficiency is thus associated with the firm-specific
intercept. Schmidt and Sickles define u;-à;-à, where à; are ordinary least
squares estimates of the intercepts and à-min~là~). The u;'s (or exp(-u;)'s) are
used as measures of inefficiency (efficiencyl. Note that this approach assumes
that the firm with the smallest á; is fully efficient and measures inefficiencies as
deviations from this firm, i.e. it leads to the analysis of relative efficiencies.
Furthermore, the use of the min operator above makes the classical distribution
theory for the u;'s difficult and, hence, it is hard to calculate standard errors for
the efficiencies. The Bayesian approach provides the tools to surmount such
problems, as will be stressed below.
In the classical random effects model, it is assumed that u; has some one-
sided distribution and maximum likelihood estimation can be carried out as
described in Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (1984). The
disadvantage of this approach over the fixed effects approach is that a
distributional assumption must be made for the inefficiencies. The advantage is
that the problems with the distributional theory of the u;'s described above do
not occur. Furthermore, Simar (1992) argues that, in practice, the fixed effects
model may produce poor estimates of the parameters and the efficiencies in the6
(usual) case where TG GN and regressors do not vary much over time.
McCulloch and Rossi (1994) rightly remark that "in the Bayesian point of
view, there is no distinction between fixed and random effects models, only
between hierarchical and non-hierarchical models". However, we feel it is useful
to construct a Bayesian framework in which the widely used panel data
terminology is preserved, and fixed and random effects models are clearly
distinguished. The distinguishing characteristic of both groups of models will, of
course, not be the deterministic or random nature of the effects, but rather the
marginal prior links between the effects. Typically, these N effects will be
assumed to be prior independent, either marginally, which gives us the Bayesian
fixed effects structure, or conditionally upon a small number m c G N of
additional parameters, which link the effects and introduce marginal dependence
of these effects across time or individuals. In the latter case, we talk of
Bayesian random effects models, which, by construction, require non-trivial
hierarchical prior structures.
2.1 Bayesian Fixed Effects Models
Standard Individual Effecis (SIEI Model
We start from the basic individual effects model in (21. As in the classical
analysis, we define a;-aofu; and let a-1a,...aN)'. Under the standard
noninformative prior, p(a,~,áZ)ao2, the full Bayesian model, therefore, is given
by:
Q N p
P(ï,a,F~.~Z I ~I-C~~fNIYII XIYtO1~P02IN1
(31
i~t
where c 10, and fNTI. ~ a,B) denotes the probability density function of a T-
variate Normal distribution with mean vector a and covariance matrix B. We
immediately infer from (3) that the marginal posterior distribution of (a,~) is the
(N f k)-variate Student-t distribution with N(T-11-k degrees of freedom. In our
application N- 382 and T - 5, so degrees of freedom are around 1,500 (the
exact value depends on kl. In the light of this, the Student-t posterior will be
almost identical to a Normal distribution and, for the rest of the SIE case, we
present results in terms of this Normal approximation.
The marginal posterior for the parameters of the cost frontier, ~, is the k-7
variate Normal distribution with
N











Equation (4) is the so-called "within estimator" from the panel data literature.
The covariance matrix for the marginal posterior for ~ is given by





The marginal posterior of a is the N-variate Normal distribution with means
Ela; ~ Y,x1-b;-Y;-Xi~ i-1,..,N.
and covariances
(61
covla;,ai ~ Y.X1-á~1 ó(T~ tx,'S-'x;) i,j-1,..,N, (7)
where óli,j) - 1 if i-j and 0 otherwise.
In the present paper, interest centres on firm-specific and predictive
efficiency. In the classical analysis of Schmidt and Sickles 11984), the authors
assumed one firm was fully efficient and measured inefficiencies relative to this
firm. In our Bayesian analysis of this model with an improper uniform prior on a,
we, too, need to measure inefficiency relative to the most efficient firm, but we
do not assign this status to one particular firm. In fact, our approach allows us
to formally treat the uncertainty implicit in deciding which is the most efficient
firm. That is, due to parameter uncertainty, it is not necessarily the case that
the firm with the smallest á; is the most efficient. Formally, we define relative8
firm-specific efficiency as r;'" - expl-u;'"1, where u;'" - u;min~lu;1- a;min~lai). The
nonnegativity restriction, following directly from the interpretation of the
inefficiency term, is not imposed on u; here, but rather on u;`". As the definition
of u;" depends on the number of firms in the sample under consideration, this
makes the implicit prior on r;'" a function of N. The implied prior distributions for
the efficiencies, r;`", are characterized by a point mass of 1IN at full efficiency
(r;`" -1) and plr;`") a 1 ~r;`"' for r;`"E (0,11. The latter is an L-shaped improper
density, which for an arbitrarily small a e(0,1) puts an infinite mass in (O,al, but
only a finite mass in [a,1). Thus the implied prior strongly favors low efficiency.
If we knew which firm was most efficient, it would be straightforward to
calculate inefficiencies relative to this firm. However, we do not know this, and
must formally incorporate this uncertainty into the analysis. The marginal
posterior distributions of u;`" and of the relative efficiency of the i'th firm, r;",
have a point mass at full efficiency given by:
Plui~-0 ~ Y,X)-Pla,-min~a~ ~ Y,X):P;, (8)
and we have the following densíty function for u;"~0:
N
PIui~I Y,X)- ~ PIu,~I Y,X,uj"-01PIujr-O ~y,Jt1
~-~.~~~ (91
N
-~ P;PIu;'r I y X,u,~-0j.
i-~.iX~
In other words, we calculate the distribution of the efficiency of firm i relative to
firm j for all j, and then weight by the probability that the j'th firm is the most
efficient. This allows us to calculate exact, finite sample results for the relative
effícíencies, and deals with the difficult distributional issues which arise in the
classical analysis of Schmidt and Sickles as a result of the min operator being
present.
It remains to describe how to calculate P~ and plu,'" ~ y,X,u~'" - Ol. P~ is the
probability that firm j is most efficient and can be expressed as:
P;-P(I`a;-aiz0 ~ Y,X1-P(qN Z0 ~ Y,XI,
where q~~ is the ( N-1)x1 vector consisting of o;-a~ for i-1,..,N, i~j. Since the
a;'s are Normally distributed, it follows that the marginal posterior of q~~ is the
(N-1)-variate Normal distribution with means9
E(rli'~ I Y,X1-à;-à~,
and covariances
Cov(q;'',qn ~ Y,x1-3~[(x;-x;l'S-'(z,,-x~) t 1 .áli,hll,
T
for i,h - 1,..,N, i~j, h~j, where ~;~'~ is a;a~. Thus, P~ is the posterior probability
mass Iocated in the positive orthant of the (N-1)-dimensional space of q~~. It is
possible to obtain analytical approximations to P~, but we choose to perform
Monte Carlo integration since the Monte Carlo draws used for calculating P~ can
also be used for calculating p(u;'8'~y,X,u~"'-01. That is, for each j, we draw
random vectors from the appropriate ( N-11-dimensional Normal distribution and
count the proportion of draws which have all elements positive; this proportion
is an estimate for P~. Note that this procedure theoretically is very
computationally intensive since it must be performed for all N firms. In practice,
however, it will usually be the case that only a few firms have non-negligible
P~'s. For this reason, we pursue the following strategy: the firms are ordered
from the smallest à~ to the largest. We start by computing P~ (which is typically
the largestl, followed by PZ, etc. We stop computation when iP~~.999. All
subsequent P~'s are set to zero. Hence, the computational demands of this
approach are much reduced.
p(u;fe' ~ y,X,u~`a' - O) can be calculated as a by-product of the Monte Carlo
iniègration procedure described in the previous paragraph. That is,
p(u;`"~y,X,u~`"-0) is equivalent to p(q;~~~y,X,q~~z01, which is the appropriate
marginal from the joint truncated Normal dístribution. Hence, the accepted
Monte Carlo draws used in calculating the P~'s automatically provide draws from
p(u;`"~y,X,u~`"-0). As log costs is the dependent variable, and interest centres
on expl-u;"'1, the Monte Carlo draws are transformed and used to plot the
efficiency measure.
One more point should be noted before proceeding to the one-sided individual
effects case. It is often of interest to allow for firm-specific inefficiency to
depend upon some other variables. For example, for hospitals it is of interest to
see if different organizational structures (eg. non-profit vs. for-profit) tend to
imply different efficiency levels. However, variables such as for-profit status do
not vary over time. If we were to introduce such time-invariant variables, then
the kxk matrix S would be singular and the posterior would not be defined.
Hence, for the standard individual effects case we do not allow for firm-specific10
efficiencies to depend on organizational structure or other firm characteristics.
Marginally Independent Efficiency Distribution (MIEDI Model
The second Bayesian fixed effects model is still characterized by the absence
of links between the individual effects, which, for a Bayesian, translates into
marginal prior independence between the u;'s. In the preceding discussion of the
standard model, a noninformative prior was used for a. However, we now use
an informative prior. When dealing with stochastic frontiers, the individual
effects, u;, are measures of inefficiency and thus, by definition, are non-
negative. This fact has motivated various classical maximum likelihood studies
(eg. Pitt and Lee (1981) and Schmidt and Sickles (19841) and will be at the
basis of our models with proper distributions on the individual effects.
As before, equation (2) provides the basic model, and let u-1u,,..,uN1' be the
vector of firm specific efficiencies. The non-negativity of the u;'s can be thought
of as prior information that the researcher should impose. We assume a particu-
lar one-sided prior distribution for u. We let u; be independent of v; and i.i.d.
exponential with firm-specific mean .1;. Note that the specification of a
distribution for the u;'s allows us to talk of absolute inefficiencies, unlike the
standard individual effects case. The parameters .1;' are assumed to have
independent exponential priors with means all equal to -llln(r') (i - 1,...N1. The
marginal prior of the efficiency of firm i, r;-exp1-u;l, is given by
p(r;1- r;-' f,B(-In(r;) ~ 1, 1, -Inlr;l), where
f1e(z ~ a,b,c1-
cf(a) ~b) f c,
b-, r 1} cl -ls.bl,
denotes the density function of the three-paramellter inJ vlerted Beta or Beta prime
distribution (see Zellner (1971, p. 375-376)). Since r- is the prior median
efficiency, prior elicitation can be performed based on an easily understood
quantity. As a result of the prior independence of the a;'s, efficiencies are
marginally prior independent. We stress that an explicit parameterization in
terms of .1;'s is not formally required, as we could immediately start from the
marginal Inverted Beta prior distributions on the u;'s. The corresponding
Bayesian model then becomes:11




However, introducing the incidental parameters .1; and thus using a trivial
hierarchical prior structure considerably facilitates the numerical analysis of this
model through Gibbs sampling. In addition, it allows for a more direct
comparison with the random effects models, to be introduced later.
In the absence of data corresponding to a particular firm f, the individual
effect u, will not be updated by the observations in the sample. Note that the
latter result requires both prior independence between u, and (u, ao, ~, dz) as
well as sampling independence over firms, which is assumed throughout.
Therefore, in Bayesian fixed effects models the sample can not help us in
predicting individual effects (efficiencies) of unobserved firms.
We wish to make inferences about ao, ~, az and u. It turns out that the joint
posterior distribution is very difficult to work with. However, conditional
posterior distributions have relatively simple forms. This suggests that a Gibbs
sampler can be set up for this model.' In particular, conditional on u and .i-' -
(~1-'... ~IN'), the posterior density of the frontier parameters and precision, áZ,
has the usual Normal-Gamma form:
P(ao,Q,aZ ~ Y,X,u,~-')-PIa Z ~ Y,X,u1P(ao,~ ~ Y,X,u,oZl, (1 1)
where
Plo2 I Y,X,u)-f~lv2 ~ NT2-t
2(Y-I~NT:Xl I~.1-Il,,,t~l,)Ul~ IY-I~NT.XI (~.1-Il,,,~lT)u]),
and
,, , a a' NT NTX '~
(12)
113) Plao,l3~Y,X,u,aZ)-fni 1~ ~I~.I,aZ ).
NTX' X~X J
In the previous equations, f~(. ~ a,b) denotes the density function of the Gamma
distribution with mean alb and variance albZ, y-(y,...yN)' an NTx1 vector,
X-1X,'...XN')' an NTxk matrix, and
'An introduction to the Gibbs sampler is given in Gelfand and Smith (1990) or Koop (1994).
A discussion of the use of Gibbs sampling techniques in stochastic frontier models with cross-
sectional data is given in Koop, Steel and Osiewalski (1994).12
,
a' NT NTX '~ NTI Y'-u)
Q- - (NTX~ X~X, - (X~Y-X~I,n~,rlu, .
Here,
N T






X.-~~~X" NT;., ~., rt
The conditional posterior for the inefficiencies takes the form:







and I'(u) is the indicator function for Rt". In other words, the u;'s are indepen-
dently Normally distributed, but truncated to the positive orthant. The conditio-
nal posterior for .i~' becomes:
N
PI~-' ~ Y,X,u,ao,rg,o21-P(.1-' ~ ul-~ fcl.l;' ~ 2,u;-In(r')1.
;.,
115)
A Gibbs sampler can be set up in terms of equations (11), (14) and (15).
Random sampling from all these densities is standard. Note that, despite the13
high dimensionality of the problem (2N f k t 2- 803 in our probleml, three steps
suffice for each Gibbs draw. It is worth stressing that this specification assumes
a separate efficiency distribution for each firm. Thus, conditionally upon the
parameters describing the frontier, the u;'s are posterior independent and are
only updated by the T observations for firm i, similarly to the a;'s in the SIE
model.
2.2 Bayesian Random Effects Models
In this Subsection, we focus on models where the individual effects are in
some way related across firms. Here we distinguish between two models
depending on the way in which these links are implemented. In the usual panel
context, one often considers a hierarchical prior for a where a is Normal with
mean po and variance oZ. The parameters po and o~2 in turn have a Normal-
Gamma prior distribution (see e.g. Box and Tiao (1973)1. It can easily be seen
that this model has the same type of structure as a classical Normal random
effects model, which is commonly assumed in the panel data literature, as e.g.
in Simar (1992). The resulting variance component model with an intra-class
covariance structure is typically analyzed using generalized least squares in a
classical framework (see e.g. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Simar (1992)),
and can readily be treated using Gibbs sampling in a Bayesían context (see, eg.,
Gelfand and Smith (19901). However, we are here dealing with individual
effects, u;, that are nonnegative by definition, and thus we will use hierarchical
structures that reflect this property. For classical maximum likelihood estimation
of random one-sided individual effects models, see Pitt and Lee (1981) and
Schmidt and Sickles 119841.
Varying Efficiency Distribution (VEDI Models
One might reasonably assume that the efficiency of hospitals with similar
characteristics could be related. One way of implementing such links is to
parameterize the mean inefficiencies A;, which were all independent in the MIED
models, as exp(-w;'y), where w; is an mx1 vector of exogenous variables, which
do not have a time component, to be used in explaining firm-specific inefficien-
cy (eg. non-profit status) and y-1Y,...Ym1' is an mx1 parameter vector, linking14
the firm effects across the sample. The parameter vector y is assumed to have a
proper prior, independent of the other parameters. All other assumptions are
identical to the MIED model. The Bayesian model is now:
PIY.u~Y.oo~~~0 2 ~ X,VV)
-P(YI X,u,Y.vo,~,~Z1P1u,YI W1PIao,Q,v-Z)
N
-caZP(Yl~ fni(Y; ~ X~t(aotu;liT, a~~N) fclur ~ 1,exPlw,'YII
;.,
(16)
where W-(w,....wN)'. We assume w;, -1. With the Gibbs sampler we now
have to deal with numerical integration in only N f k t m f 2 dimensions (425 in
our empirical application). However, this model poses an added difficulty as the
full conditional of y is not a standard dístribution. In addition, the sampler now
involves four steps. We wish to stress that our framework explicitly allows for
functional links between X; and w;, given that we condition on X(and W)
throughout. That is, we allow the individual effects to be correlated with the
variables describing the frontier.
The conditional posterior for the frontier parameters is identical to that given
previously in equations (11), (12) and (13). The conditional posterior for the
inefficiencies takes the form:
PIu ~ y,X,ao,Q,~Z,YI afN(U ~ Y-(IN:X)(~1-~~, ~~NI X~~(u1, (1 ~1
where ~-lexp(w,'yl...exp(wN yll'. In other words, the u;'s are again indepen-
dently Normally distributed, truncated to the positive orthant.
The conditional posterior for y depends on the form of the prior for y. In order
to maintain comparability with the common efficiency distribution case, to be




where tp;-explY;l.Z We express our prior information in terms of the tp;'s. In
particular, we assume that they are, a priori, i.i.d. Gamma with parameters a;
'We also assume all w;;'s are nonnegative, which is true in the present application. If it were
not true, we could add constants and subtract the appropriate term from y;.15
and g~, j- 1,..,m. Despite the conditional prior independence of the u;'s,
inefficiencies are marginally linked through the common parameter y in the
conditional mean.
The full conditionals for ~p, and for rpz,..,rpm do not depend on the data or on
(aa,~,dz), and can be written as:
N









p(~2~"~~m I V,~1) O[i~(~2~"~~m)exP(-~,~ ~,~!),
r.,
(19)
where A(~pz,..,~pm) is the product of m-1 independent Gamma densities for
~z,..,~Pm. Each of these Gamma densities has parameters a~ t N W~ and g~,
N
where W. - N-'iw;;,1-1,...m -
~.,
The Gibbs sampler involves drawing from (1 1), (17), (18) and (19). Only (19)
poses any difficulty. We use an independence Metropolis algorithm to draw
from this conditional distribution (see Tierney (1991)). Like the Gibbs sampler,
the Metropolis algorithm, is based on a Markov chain. A Markovian transition
kernel drives the chain by generating candidate values for the next draw. These
candidates are then either accepted with a certain probability, or rejected, in
which case the chain remains at the current value. The independence Metropolis
chain draws candidates independently and always from the same density, B(.).
So, on the I'th pass, this algorithm generates a candidate, rp", from 9(~p), where
~p-(~pz...~pml'. The random draw from (191, ~p"~, is then either rp" (with
probability P,), or the previous value, ~p""'~. Tierney stresses that this method
works best if 9(rp) is a good approximation to the actual posterior. For a more
detailed exposition of this method in the context of cost frontiers with a globally16
flexible functional form, see Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (19941.
Since tp is always non-negative, BI.) should reflect this. Furthermore, it can
be shown that all of the conditionals, based on (191, for ~pk (given the other ~p~,
j~kl, are unimodal.3 A convenient one-sided unimodal distribution which allows
for fat tails is the inverted Beta distribution, IB(e,b,c). We use this distribution
independently for each of the elements of rp and take c- 1. Note that this is a
very flexible distribution with mode min{0, (b-111(ef 1)} that allows for very fat
tails through the choice of e. In practice, we work with m-1 independent
IBIe~,bi,1) distributions, j-2,..,m. The parameters e~ and b~ are calibrated on the
basis of initial runs to ensure that the mode of B(.) is near that of (19) and that
the tails of 81.) are at least as fat as those of (19). The probability of switching,




~f9;1~;-'~-q5; )tlNw~ta~-b~lln( ~~~~1tle~tb~)Inl 1}~~.n)]1,
i.z ~i 1 t~~
where D;~ and D;""" are D; evaluated at the candidate draw, ~p~, and the (I-11'th
value, ~p~~"", respectively. Finally, provided NW~ 1b~a~ (which is satisfied in our
application), the ratio of 119) and B(~p) is bounded for any ~p e Rtm"', and thus
we have uniform ergodicity of the Metropolis chain, implying the strongest form
of convergence (Tierney ( 1991)1.
Common Efficiency Distribution (CEDI Model
In the previous VED model only the efficiencies of the firms with the same
characteristics (as measured by w;) are drawn from a common distribution. Here
we will develop an important special case of the VED model, where m-1, and,
since w;, - 1, this amounts to assuming that all individual effects are
independent drawings from the same distribution. Thus, the links between firm
effects will be even stronger than in the previous model.
We now assume that u; is still independent of v; and i.i.d. exponentially
distributed with a common mean N. Thus, the CED is a special case of the VED
'Formally, this is only true if Nw~ ~ 1-ak. In our application, this unimodality result always
holds.17
model with m- 1 and p-~,"'. The Bayesian model is given by (16) with W-iN,
and y--In(pl. The prior on ~i' is now taken to be exponential with mean
-1~Inlr~1, i.e. the same as the marginal prior for each .1;' used to parameterize
the MIED model. Therefore, the marginal distribution of r; will be exacily the
same as in the latter model, but the r;'s will no longer be prior independent. As p
now has the interpretation of a common mean efficiency, we will also be
interested in inference on p. For T-1 our CED model reduces exactly to the
exponential model used for analyzing cross-sectional data in van den Broeck,
Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1994).
Again, the Gibbs sampler is a natural method to treat the numerical
integration required for posterior and predictive inference. It will now be
implemented by cyclical drawings from (1 1) and (141, where A"' -~.i'iN, and from
the full conditional for N' which is:
PIl~-' ~ Y,X,u,va,R.~Z)-P(!~-' ~ u1-fc(p-' ~ (Nt11,Ar-In(r' ll. (20)
We remind the reader that the CED model is a special case of the VED model,
and we would like to specify a prior on the latter that is consistent with the
prior assumed for the CED model. In the VED model each ~~ had a Gamma prior
distribution with parameters a~ and g~, j-1,...m. To ensure prior consistency
with the CED model, we set g,--Inlr'), and g~-1 for j-2,..,m and a~-1 for
j-1,..,m. In other words, we centre the prior over the CED model with the
same hyperparameter, r~, which is no longer the prior median if m 11. In the
m
VED case, PIr;G -r') - E[(1 t~ ~~1"'J, where the expectation is with respect
to the prior of ~Z,...,~m. App~ying Jensen's inequality, we conclude that
P(r;G -r~) 1 0.5, i.e. the prior median efficiency is less than r~ whenever m11.
Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 1 illustrate some properties of the prior for the
varying and common efficiency distribution cases. The latter is a special case of
the former with m- 1. Table 2 contains prior efficiency means and standard
deviations for various values of r' for a~ - g~ - 1(j - 2,..,m1. Although changing r'
changes the prior moments, a comparison of m-1 with m- 4 for r~ - 0.8 in
Figure 1 indicates that the priors have roughly similar properties.
Table 3 investigates the effect of changing a~ and g~ (j-2,..,m) for the m-4
case. We keep a~ - g~, but let them take on a common value different from 1.18
This implies that the ip~'s still have mean 1(and hence are centred over the
m- 1 modell, but allows their prior variances to take on values different from 1.
It can be seen that changing these prior variances has relatively little effect on
the prior efficiency. Hence, in our empirical work, we set a~-g~-1 (j-2,..,m),
which is judged a reasonable value, and do not investigate other values for
these prior hyperparameters. Clearly, as a~ and g~ grow for j- 2,..,m, the prior for
rp~ (j~1) will become tighter around one and prior efficiency for the case m-4
will tend to that with m- 1 (which can be derived from the model with m 1 1 by
restricting all ~p~ (j ~ 1) to be one). Marginally, the prior moments for the
efficiency in the MIED model will be the same as in the CED (m-1) model, but
for the former the conditional prior independence is preserved in the marginal
prior for the r;'s.
Figure 1 plots the marginal prior density of efficiency for the m- 1 (r- -.8)
and m- 4(r' -.8, a~ - g~ - 1 for j- 2,..,m1 cases. In our prior sensitivity analysis,
to be discussed in Section 4, we find that posterior results for m- 1 are
extremely robust for the random effect models, even to enormous changes in r'.
In view of this, the small differences in prior between the m- 1 and m-4 cases
will undoubtedly have negligible empirical consequences. In contrast, the choice
of r' is found to be much more important in the MIED model, in line with the
fixed effects structure of that model. In addition, Figure 1 contains the
continuous part of the implied prior on the relative efficiency r;`B' for the SIE
model (with arbitrary scalingl, from which it is obvious that this model
corresponds to a very strong prior belief in low efficiency. The proper priors, on
the other hand, convey a genuine sense of lack of strong prior information. The
particular U-shaped form of their densities reflects the thick tail of the marginal
prior on u;, which is evident from (10) in the case of the MIED model.
2.3 Common Efficiency (CEl Model
An extreme case of linking the individual efficiencies would be to assume
that they are all exactly the same, i.e. u;-z (i-1,...N), where the prior on z can
be degenerate at a particular value (e.g. zero to reflect full efficiency) or can
have any other form. Since all u;'s are equal in this model, we can no longer talk
of individual effects. From an economic point of view, such a restrictive17
model with m-1 and P-~,"'. The Bayesian model is given by (16) with W-iN,
and y--InIN). The prior on N' is now taken to be exponential with mean
-1~Inlr'1, i.e. the same as the marginal prior for each .1;-' used to parameterize
the MIED model. Therefore, the marginal distribution of r; will be exactly the
same as in the latter model, but the r;'s will no longer be prior independent. As p
now has the interpretation of a common mean efficiency, we will also be
interested in inference on p. For T- 1 our CED model reduces exactly to the
exponential model used for analyzing cross-sectional data in van den Broeck,
Koop, Osiewalski and Steel 11994).
Again, the Gibbs sampler is a natural method to treat the numerical
integration required for posterior and predictive inference. It will now be
implemented by cyclical drawings from (1 1) and (14), where .1"' -N'iN, and from
the full conditional for N' which is:
PlN-' ~ Y,X,u,po,~,Q2)-P(N-' ~ ul-fclli-' ~(IVt1),Nu-In(r' ll. (20)
We remind the reader that the CED model is a special case of the VED model,
and we would like to specify a prior on the latter that is consistent with the
prior assumed for the CED model. In the VED model each ~~ had a Gamma prior
distribution with parameters a~ and g~, j-1,...m. To ensure prior consistency
with the CED model, we set g,--Inlr~), and g~-1 for j-2,..,m and a~-1 for
j-1,..,m. In other words, we centre the prior over the CED model with the
same hyperparameter, r', which is no longer the prior median if m 1 1. In the
m
VED case, P(r;G -r') - E[11 f~ tb~l-'], where the expectation is with respect
to the prior of ~z,...,~m. App~ying Jensen's inequality, we conclude that
P(r;G -r-) 1 0.5, i.e. the prior median efficiency is less than r~ whenever m~ 1.
Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 1 illustrate some properties of the prior for the
varying and common efficiency distribution cases. The latter is a special case of
the former with m- 1. Table 2 contains prior efficiency means and standard
deviations for various values of r' for a~-g~-1 (j-2,..,m). Although changing r-
changes the prior moments, a comparison of m-1 with m- 4 for r' - 0.8 in
Figure 1 indicates that the priors have roughly similar properties.
Table 3 investigates the effect of changing a~ and g~ (j - 2,..,m) for the m-4
case. We keep a~-g~, but let them take on a common value different from 1.18
This implies that the ip~'s still have mean 1(and hence are centred over the
m- 1 modell, but allows their prior variances to take on values different from 1.
It can be seen that changing these prior variances has relatively little effect on
the prior efficiency. Hence, in our empirical work, we set a~ - g~ - 1 (j - 2,..,m),
which is judged a reasonable value, and do not investígate other values for
these prior hyperparameters. Clearly, as a~ and g~ grow for j- 2,..,m, the prior for
rp~ (j11) will become tighter around one and prior efficiency for the case m-4
will tend to that with m- 1(which can be derived from the model with m 1 1 by
restricting all ~p~ (j ~ 1) to be onel. Marginally, the prior moments for the
efficiency in the MIED model will be the same as in the CED (m -1) model, but
for the former the conditional prior independence is preserved in the marginal
prior for the r;'s.
Figure 1 plots the marginal prior density of efficiency for the m- 1 (r' -.8)
and m- 4(r- -.8, a~ - g~ - 1 for j- 2,..,m) cases. In our prior sensitivity analysis,
to be discussed in Section 4, we find that posterior results for m- 1 are
extremely robust for the random effect models, even to enormous changes in r~.
In view of this, the small differences in prior between the m-1 and m-4 cases
will undoubtedly have negligible empirical consequences. In contrast, the choice
of r' is found to be much more important in the MIED model, in line with the
fixed effects structure of that model. In addition, Figure 1 contains the
continuous part of the implied prior on the relative efficiency r;`a' for the SIE
model (with arbitrary scalingl, from which it is obvious that this model
corresponds to a very strong prior belief in low efficiency. The proper priors, on
the other hand, convey a genuine sense of lack of strong prior information. The
particular U-shaped form of their densities reflects the thick tail of the marginal
prior on u;, which is evident from (10) in the case of the MIED model.
2.3 Common Efficiency ICE) Model
An extreme case of linking the individual efficiencies would be to assume
that they are all exactly the same, i.e. u;-z (i- 1,...N), where the prior on z can
be degenerate at a particular value (e.g. zero to reflect full efficiency) or can
have any other form. Since all u;'s are equal in this model, we can no longer talk
of individual effects. From an economic point of view, such a restrictive19
assumption would typically be far too dogmatic in most applications.
Statistically, the common effect z does not differ across individuals and is thus
indistinguishable from the intercept ao. Note that the sampling model is now
sufficiently parameterized in terms of K- aa f z, ,B and á~. Assuming a prior of
the form plz, ao, ,B, á~)-plz) plao, ~, dZ) with the same improper prior on the
parameters of the frontier as used before, the product structure is preserved
under the parameter transformation trom ao to K. Thus, our Bayesian model
becomes:
PIY,z,K„B.o~~ ~ X1-P(Y ~ x,K,~,oZ)PIz,K,~,a 2)
N p
-COZPlz1~ fN1Yi I XiYtKI„ a2,N)
i-1
(21)
For a Bayesian, the lack of identification translates into an absence of updating
of the marginal prior on z, as is clearly shown in (21). As a benchmark case,
this model, which does not involve any numerical integration, will also be
examined.
3. Hosr]ital Cost Function Estimation
The theory of the multiple-product firm implies that a firm's costs should
depend upon the quantity of each output produced as well as the input prices
faced by the firm. Given data on outputs and input prices, the researcher can
select a functional form for the cost frontier and estimate its parameters.
Hospital cost function estimation poses problems which render it difficult to
apply such a strategy in a straightforward manner.4 A modern hospital
produces a myriad of outputs that are hard to quantify.fi For most standard
~owing, Holtrnann and Powers (1983) provides a discussion of some of the difficulties
inherent in hospital cost function estimation.
'Most theories of the firm imply that cost minimi7ation should be a reasonable objective
function even for non-profit or government-run institutions. Empirical evidence for or against the
assumption of cost minimiTation is scanty. One ezception is Eakin and Kniesner (1988), which
estimates a long-run cost function (using 1975-76 data) that allows for systematic allocative
inefficiency and rejects the assumption of cost minimiTation. However, since estimated differences
between shadow and observed marginal costs aze small, the authors conclude that use of
traditional minimum cost functions may yield fairly accurate estimates of output concepts, such as
economies of scale and scope.20
functional forms (eg. the translogl, the large number of outputs causes the
number of parameters to be estimated to be very large. As a result, researchers
have worked with highly aggregated data. Early work in this area avoided such
flexible functional forms and worked with ad hoc (usually linearl specifications,
where the class of explanatory variables was expanded beyond that implied by
economic theory (see Breyer (1987) for a discussion). Much of the recent work
(see Vita (1990) and Granneman, Brown and Pauly (19861) has criticized these
ad hoc specifications and worked with flexible functional forms such as the
translog. In this paper, we intend to follow the path of these latter authors and
work with highly aggregated data and a translog functional form. In addition,
we adopt the stochastic frontier framework described in the previous Section.
Breyer (1987), in a survey of the hospital cost function literature, argues that
the true "output" of a hospital is improvement in patient health. Defined in this
way, "output" is impossible to measure, so Breyer recommends using observa-
ble intermediate products as proxies for output. In particular, he suggests three
important hospital output dimensions that can easily be measured: i) Number of
cases (as a proxy for medical services); ii) Number of inpatient days (as a proxy
for nursing, accommodation and other "hotel" services); and iii) Number of beds
(to satisfy an option demand for hospital services).e In the present paper, we
use these three variables as measures of output. In addition, we include the
number of outpatient visits and a case mix index as other aspects of outputs
that are included in our cost frontier.
In order to estimate a cost frontier, it is important that all firms face the same
technology. If this is the case, then deviations from the cost frontier can be
interpreted as evidence of inefficiency. However, in the hospital cost function
literature, it is often argued that different types of hospitals have different
technologies. For this reasons, it is important to have a panel of hospitals that
is as homogeneous as possible. Hence, we omit from our panel alt teaching
hospitals, since such hospitals are typically thought to behave differently from
non-teaching hospitals. Furthermore, it is possible that apparent inefficiencies
are due to certain hospitals providing a higher quality of service that is not
captured by our output measures. For instance, hospitals which have unusually
6It has been argued by some researchers that the number of beds is better considered as a
particular type of capital, this should be kept in mind when considering our empirical results.21
high ratios of employees to patients may be inefficient, or they may be offering
a higher quality of service -- we cannot know which. In light of this, we have
deleted from our panel any hospital which had an unusually high or low employ-
ee to patient ratio in any year.' In this manner, we have ensured that the panel
of hospitals under consideration is relatively homogeneous.
In our cost frontier, we also include a measure of capital stock (total fixed
assets). The fact that such a variable is included means that all our results
should be interpreted as applying in the short run.
In terms of inputs, labour is predominant. Our data source contains only one
aggregate wage index. The other significant input in the hospital technology is
general materials and supplies. Untortunately, we have no measurements on
this. However, given the wholesale buying power of most hospitals, it is
reasonable to assume that the price of materials is fairly constant across
hospitals. Hence, we treat the price of materials as a constant. Such a treat-
ment is undoubtedly reasonable cross-sectionally, but is not reasonable over
time. Thus, we add a time trend and a time trend squared as explanatory
variables in our cost frontier to try to capture the missing time dimension of the
price of materials or other dynamics that are not modelled explicitly.
With this data, we can specify a standard cost function where costs depend
on 5 output categories, one capital stock, two input prices, a time trend and a
time trend squared. We choose a translog specification, and impose linear
homogeneity in prices. The imposition of linear homogeneity allows us to
normalize with respect to the price of materials (which is a constantl, yielding










are the remaining 15 elements of ,B. A brief description of the
'More precisely, we have two variables: one of which measures the ratio of clinical workers
to average daily census, the other which measures the ratio of nonclinical workers to average daily
census. If either of these variables is more than one standard deviation from the mean for any
year, then the hospital is deleted from our panel.22
variables is given in Table 1, and more detail is provided in the Data Appendix.
The explanatory variables (w;~) for the varying efficiency distribution model are
taken to be the ownership status (i.e. non-profit, for-profit, or government) and
the Herfindahl index averaged over time.
4. Emairical Results
- In this section we discuss our empirical findings for the models considered in
Section 2: the standard individual effects ISIE) model, the marginally
independent efficiency distribution (MIED) model, the varying efficiency
distribution (VED) model, the common efficiency distribution (CED) model, and,
finally, the common efficiency (CE) model. We remind the reader that the first
two of these models are Bayesian fixed effects models, the second pair
constitute Bayesian random effects models, and the fifth model does not allow
for individual effects. These models are arranged in order of increasing prior
links between the firm-specific efficiencies. The findings from these models are
discussed and compared in different subsections containing: il properties of the
frontier, ii) properties of the efficiencies, iii) a sensitivity analysis with respect to
the chosen prior, and iv) explaining hospital-specific efficiencies. It is worth
emphasizing that prior elicitation is done on the basis of r', which is the prior
median efficiency in the MIED and CED models, and we set this prior
hyperparameter to 0.8 throughout our analysis, except for the discussion of
prior sensitivity.
Of these models, the CE model is the simplest in that it does not require
numerical integration, the SIE will be treated using direct Monte Carlo drawings,
and the numerical integration in the remaining three models can be done
efficiently through Gibbs sampling, as described in Section 2. Building upon our
findings in Koop, Steel and Osiewalski (1994) and Koop, Osiewalski and Steel
(1994), we have used a parallel implementation of Gibbs sampling, where we
conduct M runs, each containing L passes, and keep only the Lth pass of each
run. This strategy can be very effective in breaking serial correlation, induced by
the Markovian structure of Gibbs sampling, and prevents the sampler from being
stuck in a region containing small posterior probability. We have used M- 1000
throughout, whereas L- 50 for all the results except for the MIED model with23
very low values of r', where larger L was required for full convergence.
Properties of the frontier
Since our focus is on hospital efficiency analysis, we will only briefly discuss
the properties of the frontier. Instead of presenting posterior means and
standard deviations for k- 38 frontier parameters, Tables 4, 5 and 6 present
posterior means and standard deviations of cost elasticities with respect to P, Y;
(i - 1,..,5), and K, for the minimum, median, and maximum cost firms in our
sample, respectively. Note that, with a few exceptions, all of these elasticities
are consistent with the regularity conditions implied by economic theory. The
exceptions typically occur for extreme firms and for the median firm regularity
conditions are only violated with respect to Y3, which could also be considered
a type of capital stock. Given the weaknesses of our input price data and the
fact that our output measures are not really true output measures, but rather
reflect aspects of the true unobservable outputs, we feel that the properties of
our frontier are quite satisfactory. Note that economic theory, apart from
requiring the cost function to be increasing in Y; (i - 1,..,5) and P, also imposes
concavity and homogeneity of degree one in P. The latter is assured through the
normalization of (22), whereas the former translates into ~,GO. Posterior means
(standard deviations) of Q, for the SIE, MIED, VED, CED and CE models are -
1.08 (0.23), -0.80 (0.21), -0.81 (0.221, -0.79 (0.21) and -0.59 (0.21)
respectively, indicating that concavity is satisfies with virtual certainty.
The one-sided efficiency distribution models, MIED, VED and CED, exhibit
fewer violations of regularity conditions than the SIE model. In general, the one-
sided models yield very similar frontiers. The frontier for the SIE model leads to
elasticities which tend to be much smaller than those of the one-sided efficiency
models. As we shall show shortly, the inetficiencies of the SIE model tend to be
larger and differ much more across firms than with the other individual effects
models. Loosely speaking, the type of prior information on the inefficiency term
in the standard model causes more of the variation in costs to be picked up as
inefficiency. From the elasticities corresponding to the benchmark CE model,
we conclude that eliminating individual effects (inefficiencíes) seriously affects
the inference on the frontier. Therefore, we would not recommend use of the
CE model, even in those cases where one is only interested in properties of the24
cost frontier.
Prope~ties of the Efficiency Measures
The Bayesian techniques used in this paper yield exact posterior distributions
for the efficiency measures of each of our N hospitals. These are probably of
greatest interest for policy purposes. However, space precludes a detailed
presentation of efficiencies for each hospital. Instead, we present a detailed
analysis of three firms which have minimum, median and maximum efficiency in
a certain sense, and for the random effects models we consider an "average"
hospital. The notion of the efficiency of an "average" or "typical" out-of-sample
firm, r„ is discussed in van den Broeck, Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (19941.
Essentially, r, is the efficiency of a hypothetical unobserved hospital. The
posterior distribution of rf is given by:
P(i~ ~ Y,X1-r;' ~ f~( -Inlr,) ~ 1,N-'1P (N-' ~ Y,X)dN-' ,
and by
P(~~ ~ Y,X)-rf' ~ fc(-Inl~~) ~ 1,jn~i')P(~t,..~m ~ Y,X)d~,..d~m,
for the CED and VED models, respectively. For the latter model, we have
characterized the "typical" firm as having average values for the w;~'s, i.e. W. .
Note that this implies a somewhat artificial "average" hospital since some of the
w;~'s are dummy variables. In other words, plr,~y,X) is posterior to the data on
all observed firms, but prior to the unobserved output for hypothetical firm f.
The updating of r, is only possible due to prior links between efficiencies, and
hence considering r, does not make sense for the fixed effects models.
We select our minimumlmedianlmaximum efficient firms as having
maximumlmedianlminimum values for á; in the standard model (see equation
(6)1. It is worth stressing that the efficiency of a particular hospital is a random
variable. Hence, we cannot unambiguously say one hospital is more efficient
than another. So, these minimumlmedianlmaximum efficiencies (rmin~rmed~rmax)
should only be considered as corresponding to firms which are probably very25
inefficientlabout averagelvery efficient, respectively.
Figure 2 plots the marginal posterior density of r, for the CED and VED
cases. It can be seen that the plots are almost identical. If we compare Figure 2
with the prior for the one-sided efficiency distribution models in Figure 1, it can
clearly be seen that the data rule out very low efficiencies. The posterior means
(standard deviations) of r, are 0.852 (0.128) for VED and 0.856 {0.125) for the
CED model. As inference on r, in the random effects models is conducted
without knowledge of y, and X„ its distribution is much more spread out than
the posterior distributions of firm-specific efficiencies. The distribution of r,
depicted in Figure 2 also captures the uncertainty about the type of hospital. For
example, firm f could resemble the least efficient firm, but could also be like the
most efficient one.
Figures 3 through 6 plot the posterior distributions of rm;n'e', r,,,,d"', and rmax~~
for the SIE, and of rmiv rmed and rm,x for the one-sided efficiency distribution
models, respectively. Since Figures 4, 5 and 6 are almost identical, we will
focus on comparing CED with SIE (Figure 3). Remember that, for the SIE model,
efficiency is measured relative to the most efficient firm. It turns out that one
firm is almost certainly the most efficient firm (i.e. the posterior probability that
it is most efficient is .9997). For this reason the distribution of rm,x`~ is a point
mass at one. However, even for the CED model (which allows for the
calculation of absolute efficiency), rmex has all of its probability mass very close
to one. It is with regard to rTea and r,~n that major differences occur. In
particular, posterior means are much smaller for the standard model than for the
other models (0.23 vs. around 0.70 for r~;n`~ and rm;n, respectivelyl. This
behaviour is consistent with the important difference between the SIE and one-
sided distribution models. The implied prior on r;`~ (see Figure 1) simply does not
rule out very low relative efficiencies for many firms. From the fact that the
posterior results for the MIED model (with r'-0.8) are quite close to those of
the random effects models, we infer that it is not the fixed effects nature that
induces the SIE model to behave so differently from the rest.
If we replace the one-sided prior distribution on the inefficiencies with r' -0.8
by the improper prior structure of the SIE model, we tend to substantially
decrease the hospital efficiencies. Overall, the average posterior mean efficiency
is 0.47 for the SIE model and around 0.85 for the one-sided efficiency26
distribution models. However, the differences go beyond merely decreasing the
efficiency of each hospital; in many cases the ranking of efficiencies changes.
The Spearman rank correlation between the N-vector of posterior means of
hospital-specific efficiencies for the SIE and CED cases is only 0.43.
To illustrate the fact that the standard individual effects model considers
relative, rather than absolute, measures of efficiency, we have eliminated the
firm with the highest value of ~a; (which was most efficient with probability
0.9997). Then we need to consider 6 candidates for most efficient firm in order
to capture a probability mass of at least 0.999, and the average posterior mean
efficiency jumps to 0.55. Using the CED model on this reduced sample leads to
an average posterior mean efficiency of 0.85, which hardly differs from that
with the full sample.
The results from the one-sided models are, in our subjective opinion, much
more reasonable than those of the SIE model, both in terms of the efficiency
measures (is it reasonable that, as the SIE model would have, there are many
hospitals with efficiencies less than 300~0 of the most efficient one?) and the
frontier itself (fewer suggestions that regularity conditions are violated for the
one-sided casesl. Thus, we would advise against use of the SIE model.
Therefore, in the rest of the discussion of our empirical results, we will primarily
concentrate on the one-sided efficiency distribution models.
Even for the one-sided distribution models, the inference on firm-specific
efficiencies suggests that cost-minimization is not achieved by many of the
hospitals in our sample. Our analysis can not tell us, however, whether this fact
is due to managerial error or to a different nature of the objective function.
Piior Sensitivity Analysis
The one-sided individual effects models are based upon proper priors for
efficiencies. We believe that we have elicited quite reasonable priors, but it is
always important to carry out a sensitivity analysis to see if the choice of prior
hyperparameters (in our case r') has an important effect on our results. This
prior hyperparameter r' has the interpretation of the prior median efficiency for
both the MIED and CED models. Let us compare these two models, as this
enables us to isolate the effect of prior independence. For our previous
discussions, we have set r'-.8, implying that we assign a prior probability of27
0.5 to any hospital being less than 80 per cent efficient.
Figure 7 displays the average of posterior mean efficiencies over the 382
hospitals within the sample, say r, as a function of r'. The striking feature of
these graphs is that r(r') is virtually constant over the whole range from 0.01
until 0.99 for the CED model. It seems the random effect nature of this model
links the efficiencies sufficiently to ensure that the data dominate the prior
information. In sharp contrast, the fixed effects MIED model does not lead to
such robustness, as r varies substantially with r'. The independence
assumption inherent in this model, combined with the small value of T, implies
that the data information on each individual efficiency is much weaker than in
the CED case. If we take a value of r' in line with the data, say r'-0.8, then
both models lead to virtually the same inference on firm efficiencies, but if we
deviate from such a prior median efficiency, differences between the models
grow. As r' becomes very small, the MIED model will have marginal priors on
the efficiencies that are still proper, but will start to look like the marginal priors
on relative efficiencies for the SIE model. As both models are fixed effects
models and their only difference lies in the form of the marginal priors, we find,
indeed, that results for the MIED model with r'-0.01 are relatively close to the
SIE model.
To further illustrate the robustness of our results for the CED model to
extreme changes in our prior, Figure 8 plots the posterior distribution of rf for
r' -.01, .80 and .99. It can be seen that the plots are virtually indistinguishable.
Posterior means of r~ for these three values of r' are 0.843 ,0.856, and 0.857
and posterior standard deviations 0.133, 0.125, and 0.124. This is strong
evidence that results reported for the CED case are not dependent on the
specific values of the prior hyperparameter.
Explaining Efficiencies
The VED model explicitly allows for hospital characteristics to affect
efficiencies. We have considered a number of candidate variabtes for W. The
characteristics we finally retain are non-profit, for-profit or government-run
status and a Herfindahl index, which is averaged over time since the w;~
variables parameterize efficiencies which are assumed to be constant over time.
However, we can also use the other individual effects models to shed some28
light on factors which may affect efficiency. Table 7 presents average posterior
means and standard deviations of individual efficiencies for for-profit, non-protit
and government-run hospitals. Once again, the one-sided efficiency cases yield
almost identical results for r'-0.8. However, results for the SIE model are
different. All models find that government-run hospitals are more efficient, but
they disagree over whether non-profit hospitals tend to be more efficient than
for-profit hospitals. Relative to the average posterior standard deviation of the
efficiencies, the differences between types of hospitals is small. Overall, we
cannot conclude that there is a pronounced systematic relationship between
hospital organization and efficiency.
The varying efficiency distribution model allows us to investigate directly the
effect of the w;'s on efficiency. Posterior means and standard deviations for the
elements of y are given in Table 8, in the order: intercept, non-profit, for-profit
and average Herfindahl index. To aid in interpretation, note that the variables
are normalized so that each element of w; has mean 1 and that 7096 of the
hospitals in the panel are non-profit, 170~o for-profit and 13oi6 government-run.
Thus, the value of wi2 for a non-profit hospital is 1.43 and wi3 for a for-profit
hospital is 5.88. The posterior means of y given in Table 7 are consistent with
government-run hospitals being most efficient followed by non-profit and for-
profit hospitals. The posterior mean of y„ the coefficient on the Herfindahl
index, indicates that a less competitive environment tends to decrease
efficiency. However, all these findings must be qualified since posterior standard
deviations are large compared to means. Aside from y, Iwhich corresponds to
the intercept), all of the posterior means are close to zero (relative to their
standard deviationl. An approximate Bayesian Highest Posterior Density interval
test (see Zellner (1971), p. 298-302) strongly favours the CED model.
Remember that the CED model is equal to the VED model with y2-..-ym-0. If
the posterior for the y;'s (j - 2,..,m) is approximately Normal, then the
distribution of the inner product of the standardized y~'s is approximately ~Im-
1). For our data, this quantity, evaluated at zero, is 1.94. This clearly indicates
that the data do not provide evidence against the hypothesis that the y~'s are 0
11-2...,m1.
In Koop, Osiewalski and Steel (1994), a predictive measure of lack of fit is
developed, a detailed justification of which is given therein. If we let en - u, f vh,2s
then we advocate using E(e„ Z ~y,X) - EIa2 f 2~ ~ y,X) as a measure of fit for the
CED model. For the VED model, ezp(-w;'y) is analogous to N, so we use
EIo2 t 2exp1-?rm'y) ~ y,X,W), where im is the average of the w;'s, which we use
for w, corresponding to the average firm. The measure of fit is 0.065 for the
VED and 0.061 for the CED model.e In other words, in terms of our measure of
fit, the VED model performs worse, as a result of the uncertainty in estimating
y. We cannot construct a comparable measure for the other models. However,
note the the posterior mean of o2 is 0.0034 for the SIE model, 0.0042 for the
MIED and 0.0043 for both random effects models. The fact that the prior of the
SIE model strongly favours low efficiencies implies that measurement error is
smaller for this latter model, as much more of the total error is atlocated to
inefficiency. At the other extreme, in the CE model all of the stochastics is, by
definition, attributed to the measurement error term, which results in the
posterior mean of aZ being 0.0145.
Figure 9 plots the posterior density of r~ for non-profit, for-profit and
government-run hospitals based on the VED model. Corresponding means
(standard deviations) are 0.859 (0.125), 0.764 (0.208) and 0.875 (0.135) for
non-profit, for-profit and government-run hospitals, respectively. This merely
reinforces our previous conclusions, viz. that we cannot with any confidence
conclude that the type of hospital organization can help improve efficiency.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have described and analyzed Bayesian models for inference
on firm-specific efficiencies. We show how, by using different prior structures,
we can derive Bayesian analogues to the classical fixed and random individual
effects models. i) The fixed effects models are characterized by the absence of
links between individual effects, and thus do not require a hierarchical prior
structure. Within this class, we define the standard individual effects (SIE)
model, which puts an improper uniform prior on the firm-specific intercepts and
measures relative efficiencies as differences between the intercepts, and the
marginally independent efficiency distribution (MIED) model, where independent
eNote that it is not necessary for this measure of fit to be smaller for the more flezible varying
efficiency distribution model.30
proper one-sided priors are used for individual effects, and efficiencies are thus
defined in absolute terms. ii) Bayesian random effects models do link individual
effects through the hierarchical structure of the prior, parameterizing the N
effects in terms of a small number m c c N of additional parameters. The
common efficiency distribution (CED) model takes m-1 and assigns a common
exponential prior distribution to efficiencies; the varying efficiency distribution
(VEDI model allows the mean of the exponential prior to vary according to m-1
hospital characteristics.
The seemingly innocuous flat prior on individual intercepts associated with
the SIE model enables us to reinterpret many classical results in a Bayesian
context (see e.g. (41-(711. However, adoption of this model necessarily implies a
strong prior belief in low firm efficiencies, which is very different from those
commonly held. Furthermore, the fixed effects nature of this model makes it
difficult for the sample to correct this prior information when T is small. For this
reason, we would advocate using the one-sided individual effects models for
inference on efficiencies in a stochastic frontier context. Whereas the MIED
model allows us to capture our prior beliefs through any proper distribution that
we judge reasonable, its fixed effects structure still implies a large sensitivity to
the choice of the particular prior when T is not large. Furthermore, the lack of
links between individual effects inherent in fixed effects models make prediction
of these effects for unobserved firms a useless exercise.
We apply our methods to a panel of U.S. hospitals and obtain reasonable
results for both random effects models, which display an impressive robustness
with respect to large changes in our prior hyperparameter. One finding that is
common to all the individual effects models examined is that variables reflecting
hospital organization (i.e. non-profit, for-profit or government-run status) do not
help explain hospital efficiencies. Even when explicitly modeled in the VED case,
we have to conclude that ownership status as well as many other hospital
characteristics (e.g. Herfindahl index) fail to give a deeper understanding of the
substantial variability of efficiencies found in the sample.31
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Data Appendix
The major data sets used in this analysis come from two independent
sources: the American Hospital Association's (AHA) Annual Survev of Hosoitals
and the Health Care Financing Association (HCFA) Hospital Cost Reporting
Information System (HCRISI data files. Data were obtained for 1987-1991. The
HCRIS files are cycles five through nine (1987-1991) of the Prospective
Payment System (PPS). The sample represents all hospitals for which both
AHA and PPS data were available, after eliminating specialty hospitals, all
inclusive rate payers, and hospitals with fewer than 100 beds. The data bases
of those 68 hospitals subject to all-payer systems of reimbursement were not
comparable with those of the larger groups; the group of small hospitals exhibit
cost structures that are distinctly different from those of hospitals having 100
or more beds.
To ensure a homogeneous panel we included only hospitals which produce all
outputs and do not have a teaching mission (i.e. have neither a medical school
affiliation nor a Council of Teaching Hospitals membership). As described in the
text, we also excluded hospitals which had unusually high employee to patient
ratios. The variables used for this procedure were the ratios of full-time equiva-
lent clinical and non-clinical personnel to average daily census. Both came from
the AHA survey.
The cost frontier incorporates the following. The dependent variable is the
total of all direct costs, excluding Medicare non-reímbursable cost and capital
related expenditures. The AHA measures of total discharges, inpatient days,
facility bed total and outpatient visits are included as hospital outputs. To
correct for case mix we use Medicare's DRG Case Mix Index as a fifth output
category. The only available measure of input prices is that of wages. We use
the indices of local area wage rates produced by HCFA for use in hospital cost
research. Unfortunately, this has been rebased over time and, hence, the time
series component of this series is questionable. To correct this problem, we
divide each year's data by a constant to ensure that, on average, hospital
wages are rising at the same rate as manufacturing wages. For capital stock we
use the PPS calculation of total fixed assets.
In order to explain inefficiencies, we include measures of organization and
market structure. A Herfindahl index is used as a measure of market
competition, constructed using the county as market, and number of discharges
as a measure of output from which to determine market shares. That the county
is an acceptable alternative to a uniform geographic area in defining markets
was found be Garnick et al. (1987). To see if different organizational structures
affect efficiency, we include ownership dummies using the PPS categories of
non-profit, profit and other (city, county or state facility).34
Table 1: Description of Variables
C - costs (facility operating expenditure)
Y, - number of discharges
YZ - number of inpatient days
Y3 - number of beds
Y4 - number of outpatient visits
Y5 - case mix index
P - wage index
K - capital stock
t - time trend
w, - intercept
w2 - dummy variable for non-profit hospitals
w3 - dummy variable for for-profit hospitals (dummy for government-run
hospitals dropped)
w, - Herfindahl index averaged over time
Table 2: Prior Means of Efficiency for Different Values of r
(Prior standard deviations in brackets)
r' - .01 .20 .50 .80 .99
MIED 0.16 0.32 0.48 0.69 0.96
CED (0.26) (0.32) (0.34) (0.30) (0.11)
VED 0.10 0.19 0.28 0.42 0.78
(m - 41 (0.23) (0.31) (0.35) (0.39) (0.32)
Table 3: Prior Means of Efficiency for Different Values of a~ and g~, j 11, r' - 0.8
(Prior standard deviations in brackets)















Table 4: Posterior Means of Elasticities for Minimum Cost Hospital
(Posterior standard deviations in brackets)
P Y Y Y Y Y K
SIE 0.52 -0.07 0.42 0.30 -0.01 -0.26 0.03
(0.11) (0.06) (0.081 (0.08) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03)
MIED 1.19 0.09 0.47 0.32 -0.02 0.33 0.14
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.151 (0.03)
VED 1.18 0.09 0.48 0.32 -0.02 0.37 0.13
(0.1 1) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.15) (0.03)
CED 1.22 0.09 0.47 0.33 -0.02 0.35 0.13
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.15) (0.03)
CE 1.18 0.16 0.56 0.20 -0.03 0.85 0.08
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) (0.18) (0.03)
Table 5: Posterior Means of Elasticities for Median Cost Hospital
(Posterior standard deviations in bracketsl
P Y Y Y Y Y K
SIE 0.46 0.11 0.50 -0.11 0.05 0.44 0.07
(0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.11) (0.021
MIED 0.81 0.30 0.53 -0.04 0.07 0.92 0.13
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.1 1) (0.02)
VED 0.78 0.30 0.53 -0.04 0.06 0.92 0.13
(0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.10) (0.02)
CED 0.82 0.30 0.53 -0.03 0.07 0.92 0.13
(0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.10) (0.021
CE 0.77 0.36 0.46 -0.02 0.07 0.73 0.16
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02)36
Table 6: Posterior Means of Elasticities for Maximum Cost Hospital
(Posterior standard deviations in brackets)
P Y Y Y Y Y K
SIE 0.00 0.29 0.42 -0.07 0.05 -0.10 0.09
( 0.1 1) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.13) (0.03)
MIED 0.22 0.39 0.45 0.07 0.08 0.28 0.11
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03)
VED 0.20 0.40 0.44 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.11
(0.1 1) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03)
CED 0.23 0.40 0.44 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.12
(0.09) (0.06) (0.071 (0.06) (0.02) (0.12) (0.03)
CE 0.46 0.41 0.38 -0.03 0.04 0.52 0.17
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02)
Table 7: Averages of Posterior Means of Efficiencies for Hospital Subgroups
(Avera es of posterior standard deviations in brackets)
Non- For-profit Govt.- all
profit run
SIE 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.47
10.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
MIED 0.85 0.79 0.86 0.84
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
VED 0.86 0.79 0.85 0.85
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CED 0.86 0.80 0.87 0.85
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
- Posterior Means and Standard Deviations of
Y Y Y Y
Mean 2.30 -0.18 -0.14 -0.23
St. Dev. 0.69 0.50 0.14 0.27FIGURE 1: MARGINAL PRIOR OF EFFICIENCIES
one-sided indiv. effects (r~-0.8J, S~E
MIED, CED ----- VED (m-4) SIE
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